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Abstract—Device-to-Device (D2D) communications, which al-
low direct communication among mobile devices, have been
proposed as an enabler of local services in 3GPP LTE-Advanced
(LTE-A) cellular networks. This work investigates a hierarchical
LTE-A network framework consisting of multiple D2D operators
at the upper layer and a group of devices at the lower layer.
We propose a cooperative model that allows the operators to
improve their utility in terms of revenue by sharing their devices,
and the devices to improve their payoff in terms of end-to-end
throughput by collaboratively performing multi-path routing. To
help understanding the interaction among operators and devices,
we present a game-theoretic framework to model the cooperation
behavior, and further, we propose a layered coalitional game
(LCG) to address the decision making problems among them.
Specifically, the cooperation of operators is modeled as an
overlapping coalition formation game (CFG) in a partition form,
in which operators should form a stable coalitional structure.
Moreover, the cooperation of devices is modeled as a coalitional
graphical game (CGG), in which devices establish links among
each other to form a stable network structure for multi-path
routing. We adopt the extended recursive core, and Nash network,
as the stability concept for the proposed CFG and CGG,
respectively. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed
LCG yields notable gains compared to both the non-cooperative
case and a LCG variant and achieves good convergence speed.
Keywords- D2D communications, LTE-Advanced network,
layered coalitional game, coalitional structure formation,
multi-path routing, extended recursive core, coalitional graph-
ical game, Nash network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-Device (D2D) communications [1], [2] have
emerged as a promising paradigm for 3GPP LTE-Advanced
(LTE-A) networks, which provide mobile wireless connectiv-
ity, reconfigurable architectures, as well as various wireless
applications (e.g., network gaming, social content sharing and
vehicular networking) for better user experience. With D2D
communications, nearby devices in a cellular network can
communicate with each other directly bypassing the base
stations. Conventional D2D communications commonly refer
to direct information exchanges among devices in Human-
to-Human and Machine-to-Machine communications, without
the involvement of wireless operators. However, conventional
D2D technologies cannot provide efficient interference man-
agement, security control and quality-of-service guarantee [2].
Recently, there is a trend towards operator-controlled D2D
communications to facilitate profit making for operators as
well as better user experience for devices [2].
This paper considers a multi-hop LTE-A network consists
of devices deployed by multiple operators. In this network,
an efficient approach to improve the end-to-end throughput
is to enable cooperative sharing of idle devices among the
operators for multi-path routing [3]. The cooperation can
increase throughput for the devices because a cooperative
relay may substantially lead to improved network capacity.
Accordingly, a larger amount of user traffic demand can be
supported, which will lead to higher aggregated revenue for
operators. In this cooperation, each operator needs to decide
on which operators to cooperate with to maximize profit and,
given the cooperation behavior of operators. Then, the devices
from cooperative operators need to make decision on which
devices to cooperate with to maximize throughput. We call the
formation of this interrelated operator cooperation and device
cooperation as a hierarchical cooperation problem, which is
the main focus of this paper. The hierarchical cooperation
gives rise to two major concerns. Firstly, what is the stable
coalitional structure desirable for all operators so that none of
operators is willing to leave the coalition? Secondly, what is
the stable network structure for cooperative devices to perform
multi-path routing? This paper addresses these two concerns
by formulating a layered game framework to model the LTE-
A network with operators and devices being the players in the
upper and lower layer, respectively. Previous work has also
considered game-theoretic framework with hierarchies/layers,
e.g., [4] in the cognitive radio networks, [5] in two-tier
femtocell networks and [6] in WRNs. However, most of the
works considered the competition relationship between differ-
ent layers, which belongs to the Stackelberg game concept
[7]. In the proposed layered game framework, different layers
interact to improve the benefit of each other cooperatively. We
adopt the concepts of an extended recursive core and Nash
network as the solutions for the proposed games in the upper
layer and lower layer, respective. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work to introduce the application of extended
recursive core in wireless communications.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider an LTE-A network consisting of a number of
devices belonging to multiple operators. We denote the set
of operators as H = {1, 2, ..., H}, and the set of devices of
operator h ∈ H as M(h) = {1, 2, ...,Mh}. The operators
are willing to form overlapping coalitions to maximize their
individual profits. An overlapping coalitional structure for a
number of operators can be defined in a cover function as
the set piH = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sz} which is a collection of non-
empty subsets of H such that
⋃z
k=1 Sk = H, ∀k,Sk ⊆ H and
the sub-coalitions could overlap with each other. z is the total
number of coalitions in collection piH. Let Γh denote the set
of coalitions that operator h belongs to.
For multiple access at every hop, we consider an OFDMA-
Fig. 1. System model of Operator controlled D2D Communications
based transmission1. In an operator coalition S ⊆ H, each
relay device i ∈M(h) not only needs to support internal flow
transmission demand, but also can serve as a relay for other
devices from cooperative operators h′ ∈ S \ {h}. Due to the
limited transmission power of each device, multi-hop relaying
is adopted to route flow sessions from source devices to
destination devices. Since single path routing is too restrictive
for satisfying traffic demand, we assume each flow session can
be split for multi-path routing if necessary.
Figure 1 illustrates an example for the studied system model
and the corresponding notations. In this example, the LTE-A
network is composed of 8 devices deployed by 3 different
operators, i.e., H = {O1, O2, O3}, MO1 = {D1, D2, D3},
MO2 = {D4, D5, D6} and MO3 = {D7, D8}. From Fig.
1, there is a multi-path flow sourced from D1 to D2 and
a single-path flow sourced from D8 to D7. From the cho-
sen links, the final coalitional structure of the operators is
{(O1, O2), (O2, O3)}.
Let Lh = {1, 2, . . . , l(h)} denote the set of flow sessions
from operator h. N (l(h)) denote the set of nodes of flow l(h).
The source and destination device of flow l(h) is represented as
s(l(h)) and d(l(h)), respectively. We denote the link between
two devices i and j as (i, j).
The channel gain on a link (i, j) can be obtained from [9]:
gij = β ·d
−n
ij , where β is the antenna related constant, n is the
path loss exponent, and dij is the distance between devices i
and j.
f(i,j)(l
(h)) denotes the data rate on link (i, j) attributed to
a flow session l(h) ∈ L(h), h ∈ S ⊆ H. Since, for D2D
communications, a flow session from a source device may
traverse multiple relay devices to reach its destination device,
we consider the following two cases about a device.
1) If a device i is the source or destination of flow session
l(h), i.e., i = s(l(h)) or i = d(l(h)), then∑
j∈Ai
f(i,j)(l
(h)) = r(l(h)) or
∑
p∈Ai
f(p,i)(l
(h)) = r(l(h)), (1)
where r(l(h)) is the aggregated rate of flow session l(h), and
Ai denotes the set of devices having direct link with i.
2) If a device i is an intermediate relay device of flow
1Other multiple access techniques can be used without loss of generality
in the analysis of this paper
session l(h), i.e., i 6= s(l(h)) and i 6= d(l(h)), then
j 6=s(l(h))∑
j∈Ai
f(i,j)(l
(h)) =
p6=d(l(h))∑
p∈Ai
f(p,i)(l
(h)). (2)
Let cij denote the capacity of link (i, j). The aggregated
data rate on each link (i, j) cannot exceed the link’s capacity.
Thus we have the following constraint,
∑
S∈Γh
∑
h∈S
i6=d(l(h)),j 6=s(l(h))∑
l(h)∈L(h)
f(i,j)(l
(h)) ≤ cij . (3)
Let f⋆(i,j)(l
(h)) denote the maximal rate a flow session l(h)
that is available on link (i, j), with the constraints in (1), (2)
and (3), and F ⋆(l(h)) the maximal aggregated rate of a flow
session l(h). We have F ⋆(l(h)) =
∑i=s(l(h))
j∈Si
f⋆(i,j)(l
(h)). The
aggregated rate of flow session l(h) ∈ L(h) is constrained by
r(l(h)) =
{
D(l(h)), D(l(h)) ≤ F ⋆(l(h)),
F ⋆(l(h)), Otherwise, (4)
where D(l(h)) is the rate demand of flow session l(h).
III. LAYERED COALITIONAL GAME FOR HIERARCHICAL
LTE-A NETWORKS
A. Layered Coalitional Game Framework
We formulate a game-theoretic framework, referred to as the
layered coalitional game (LCG), to model the decision-making
process of hierarchical cooperation between the operators and
devices. Both operators and devices are assumed to be self-
interested and rational. The operators aim to maximize their
individual utility, while the devices attempt to maximize their
end-to-end throughput with the help of relay devices from
cooperative operators. In this LCG, the operators need to
decide on the coalitional structure and the devices need to
make decisions to form a relay network structure, both in
distributed ways, with the aim to improve their utilities and
payoffs respectively. As both operators and devices only have
limited information at their own layer, information exchange
between both layers is required. The operators need to collect
the payoff information from devices, to make the decision
of coalitional structure formation. The decision of operators
will then be provided to the devices for the purpose of
network structure formation. In this regard, there could be
multiple interactions between the operator layer and device
layer. Recognizing the behavior of operators and devices,
we propose to use the overlapping coalition formation game
(CFG) to model the behavior of operators and the coalitional
graphical game (CGG) to characterize the interaction among
devices, which will be introduced in Section III-B and Section
III-C, respectively.
Since operators and devices have different objectives and
concerns during the cooperation, our next step is to define the
objective functions to capture the incentives for operators and
devices. For a given operator coalition S, we define the payoff
of a device i ∈ M(h) from operator h ∈ S, which performs
flow transmission, as the end-to-end throughput of the flow
from device i to device k, which is expressed as follows,
v({i}) =
∑
S∈Γh
∑
h∈S
∑
l(h)∈Lh
i=n(l(h))∑
j∈Ai
f(i,j)(l
(h)) (5)
with the constraints in (2), (3), (4)
where n(l(h)) ∈ N (L(h)).
A relay device j aims to help a device i on transmission to
improve the throughput by most. Therefore, to evaluate how
much the relay device j can help to improve the throughput
of the device i, we define the payoff of the relay device j as
the difference between the throughput of the device i with the
help of device j and that without the help of device j, which
can be expressed as follows:
v({j}) = v(j)({i})− v(/j)({i})
=
∑
S∈Γh
∑
h∈S
∑
l(h)∈Lh
i=n(l(h))∑
j∈Ai∪{j}
f(i,j)(l
(h))
−
∑
S∈Γh
∑
h∈S
∑
l(h)∈Lh
i=n(l(h))∑
j′∈Ai
f(i,j)(l
(h)) (6)
with the constraints in (2), (3), (4)
where v(j)({i}) represents the payoff of device i with the
help of device j and v(/j)({i}) represents the payoff of device
i without the help of device k. In the proposed LCG, operators
are allowed to form overlapping coalitions to share their idle
devices as relays with the aim to improve the aggregated
throughput.
Through multi-path routing, each operator aims to improve
the aggregated throughput as much as possible. Thus, in return,
higher revenue for providing the flow to meet the customer
demand will be rewarded for each operator. We define the
individual utility of the operator as the profit, i.e., revenue
minus the cost of devices in transmitting and forwarding a
packet (e.g., due to energy consumption). Let PR denote the
rewarded revenue per unit throughput achieved per unit time,
and PCi denote the operation cost per device i per unit time.
In this case, we assume PR >> PCi . Then, given a partition
piH, for an operator h without cooperation, i.e., {h} ∈ piH, the
utility function uπH({h}) can be calculated as (7),
uπH({h}) =
∑
l(h)∈L(h)
i=s(l(h))∑
j∈Ai
f(i,j)(l
(h)) · PR
−
∑
l(h)∈L(h)
∑
i∈N (l(h))
PCi . (7)
with the constraints in (2), (3), (4)
The first term and the second term on the right side of (7)
represents the aggregated revenue for operator h and the total
device costs, respectively.
While cooperation can lead to profit improvement for op-
erators, it may also incur inherent coordination costs, such as
packet overhead. Let ξ(Sh) denote the coalition cost incurs to
operator h for being coaliton S. The objective for operator
cooperation through cooperative sharing of devices, is to
maximize their aggregated profit, i.e., revenue is subtracted
by device operation cost and coalition cost. Given the partition
piH, we define the utility of an operator coalition S ∈ piH as
the profit of the coalition as follows,
uπH(S) =
∑
h∈S
∑
l(h)∈L(h)
i=s(l(h))∑
j∈Ai
f(i,j)(l
(h)) · PR
−
∑
h∈S
∑
l(h)∈L(h)
∑
i∈N (l(h))
PCi −
∑
h∈S
ξ
(S)
h (8)
with the constraints in (2), (3), (4)
B. Overlapping Coalition Formation Game
An overlapping CFG is formulated among operators whose
interests are to satisfy its internal flows with as less cost
as possible. Due to interference, the utility of any operator
is affected by not only the behavior of others in the same
coalition, but also that of operators from other coalitions. Thus,
the considered operator coalitional game is in a partition form
since the aggregated utility of a coalition S ∈ piH depends
on the coalitional structure piH of all the operators H in the
network. We introduce the framework of an overlapping CFG
in partition form with non-transferable utility to model the
cooperation among operators.
Definition 1. An overlapping CFG in partition form with non-
transferable utility (NTU) is defined by a pair (H, u) where H
is the set of players, and u is a value function that maps every
partition piH and every coalition S ∈ H,S ∈ piH to a real
number that represents the total utility (profit) that players in
coalition S can obtain.
The strategy of an operator is to form the coalitions to
improve its individual utility defined by (7). Note that different
from non-overlapping CFG where players have to cooperate
with all others in the same coalition and each player only stays
in one coalition, in an overlapping CFG, each player is able
to join multiple different coalitions.
The solution of the overlapping CFG is the stable overlap-
ping coalitional structure for operators, under which no one
will deviate. To this end, we adopt the concept of extended
recursive core [8], referred to as γ†-core, as the solution.
γ†-core is an extended solution of coalition formation game,
which allows coalitions to overlap, accounting for externalities
across coalitions. In the proposed game, the externalities are
represented by the inter-coalition interference between devices.
Deviation is a key notion for the definition of the γ†-core.
As a consequence of deviation, a new partition will be formed.
Therefore, the deviation is equivalent to the formation of a new
partition. In the proposed operator coalitional game,
Definition 2. Let partition piH move to pi′H by deviation.
• Complete deviation: If there exists DC ⊆ H and piDC ⊆
pi′ such that for all h ∈ DC , for all coalition (S, pi)
such that h ∈ S,S /∈ piDC , then the player set DC
performs complete deviation. The players h ∈ DC are
called complete deviators.
• Partial deviation: If there exists DP ⊆ H containing
only overlapping players such that for all h ∈ DP , for
all S ∈ piH,S /∈ pi′H, then the player set DP performs
partial deviation. The players h ∈ DP are called partial
deviators.
In an overlapping CFG in a partition form, if a coalition
of players performs a complete deviation or partial deviation,
this may affect the payoffs of the remaining players. For
the remaining players, we then define the residual game as
following:
Definition 3. Let (H, v) be an overlapping CFG in partition
form. If a subset of players S has already organized themselves
into a certain partition piS . A residual game (R, v) is an
overlapping CFG in a partition form defined on a set of
players R = H \ S. The players in R are called residuals.
The residual game is an overlapping CFG in partition form
on its own. In the residual game, the players react to the
deviation only on the set of remaining players including partial
deviators which can play further deviation.
Given two payoff vectors x,y ∈ R|H|, if ∀i ∈ S ⊂ H,
xi > yi, and ∃j ∈ S, xj > yj , we write x >S y. Let (x, piH)
denote an outcome of the game, where x is a utility vector
resulting from a partition piH. Let C(H, v) denote the γ†-core
of game (H, v), and Π(H, v) denote the set of all the possible
partitions of H. γ†-core can be found inductively in four main
steps [8]
1) Trivial Game: Given a coalitional game (H, v), the
γ†-core of a coalitional game with H = {1} is composed
of the only outcome with the trivial partition: C({1}, v) =
(v({1}); {1}).
2) Inductive Assumption: Given the γ†-core C(R, v) for
each game with |R| < |H| players, the assumption about the
residual game (R, v) is defined as follows:
A(R, v) =
{
C(R, v), C(R, v) 6= ∅,
Π(R, v), Otherwise, (9)
3) Dominance: An outcome (x, piH) is dominated via a
coalition S if for at least one (yH\S , piH\S) there exists
an outcome ((yS , yH,\S), piS ∪ piH\S) ∈ Π(H, v) such that
(yS , yH\S) >S x.
4) γ†-core Generation: The γ†-core of a game of |H|
players is the set of undominated outcomes.
The concept of dominance expresses that, given a current
partition piH and the respective payoff vector x, an undomi-
nated coalition S represents a deviation from piH in such a
way that the reached outcome ((yS , yH\S), piS∪πH\S ) is more
rewarding for the players in coalition S, compared to x. Thus,
γ†-core can be seen as a set of partitions, under which the
players cooperate in self-organized overlapping coalitions that
provides them with the highest payoff.
During the coalition formation process of the operator
coalitional game, in order to reach an outcome lies in γ†-core,
we let each operator iteratively joins and leaves the coali-
tions to ensures a maximum payoff (i.e., an undominated
outcome). To prevent loop, we introduce a variable couple
history (H(Γh), H(v({h}))) for each operator to record all
the coalitions that it has ever joined and the corresponding
utility. If the new coalition for operator h to join has been
recorded and the utility that it is about to get is the same as the
history, then operator h will maintain the current coalition set
Γh even if its utility will better off. Once operator h changes
its coalition set, the new coalition set is included in history.
We propose the coalition formation algorithm for operators
in Algorithm 1 to reach the stable coalitional structures in
γ†-core.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Coalition Formation Game
Initial State
In the starting network, the operators are partitioned by piH =
H = 1, · · · ,H with non-cooperative operators.
Coalition Formation Process
Phase 1 Network Discovery
Devices from the same operators perform the Dynamic Virtual
Link Formation algorithm specified in Algorithm 2. Based
on the information feedback from device layer, each
operator h calculates the corresponding utility in
non-cooperative case.
Phase 2 Coalition Formation
The operators play their strategies sequentially in a random
order.
repeat
1) Each operators h ∈ H sequentially engages in pair-
wise negotiations with another operator h′ ∈ H \ {h}
to identify potential cooperator. During this process,
the devices from the operator pair perform Dynamic
Virtual Link Algorithm. Based on the information
feedback, each operator calculates its potential utility.
2) Based on the potential utility information and
history, the pair of operators decides to form a new
coalition S = {h, h′} if it ensures the utility
improvement.
3) The operators already that have cooperation with any
operator in S update their utility. Based on the
updated utility and history, they perform deviation with
the operator(s) in S if it leads to utility improvement.
until any further coalition formation does not result in
utility improvement of at least one operator, i.e., conver-
gence to a stable partition in the γ†-core.
Phase 3 Cooperative Sharing
The operators share their relay devices with cooperative
operators for multi-path routing according to the final
network graph G⋆F .
The convergence of the operator coalitional game is guar-
anteed due to the fact that 1) the total number of possible
partitions with overlapping coalitions is finite, 2) the transition
from a partition to another leads to the increase of individual
utility, and 3) the game contains mechanism to prevent the
operators to re-visit a previously formed coalitional structure.
As a result, each cooperation buildup and breakup will lead to
a new partition. As the number of the partition can be visited is
finite, the game is guaranteed to reach a final partition, under
which the utility of each operator can be no longer increased.
Furthermore the last partition lies in the γ†-core because 1)
during the coalition formation process only the partitions that
bring improvement of individual utility for each operator are
formed, and 2) in the final convergent partition, there are no
dominated coalitions which the operators are better off by
deviating from.
C. Coalitional Graphical Game
In the CGG, the source devices need to play transmis-
sion strategy, while the relay devices need to play not only
transmission strategy but also relay strategy. The transmission
strategy for a source device i is to send a link establishment
proposal to a relay j ∈ M(h), h ∈ Γh which can help to
improve its payoff defined in (5). The relay strategy for a
relay device j is to accept or reject a link proposal from
a transmitting device i ∈ M(h), h ∈ Γh which increases
its payoff defined in (6). Once the relay device accepts the
link establishment proposal, it will need to play transmission
strategy like a source device.
We consider that an device i can have multiple incoming
and outgoing flows simultaneously, constrained by (2), (3) and
(4), and the maximum transmit power is limited to Q⋆i . We
denote si the strategy space which consists of all the strategies
of device i. When device i plays strategy si, while all other
devices maintain their current strategies denoted by a vector
s−i, the resulting network graph is denoted by Gsi,s−i .
All the devices are considered to be myopic in the sense
that each device responds to improve the payoff given the
current strategies of the other devices. That is, each devices
plays myopically without the foresight of the future evolution
of the network. Based on this, we define the concept of best
response for devices as follows:
Definition 4. A strategy s⋆i ∈ Si is a best response for a
device i ∈ N , if v{i}(Gs⋆,s−i) ≥ v{i}(Gsi,s−i), ∀si ∈ Si.
Based on the concept of best response, we introduce the
myopic dynamics algorithm for the proposed CGG shown in
Algorithm 2. We define an iteration as a round of myopic
plays during which each device chooses to play its current
best response s⋆i ∈ Si sequentially in a random order with
the aim to maximize its payoff given the current strategies
of others. The dynamic virtual link formation process may
consist of one or more iterations, as the best strategy of
each device may change over time. All the devices play best
strategies based on their flow demands. Each source device has
a certain self-generated flow demand, while the flow demand
of a relay device is equal to its incoming throughput. To meet
the flow demand, the device on transmission may propose
a link establishment proposal to multiple relay devices. The
iteration stops when either all the flow demands of devices
are satisfied or none of the devices can unilaterally change
its strategy to improve its payoff. In other words, when the
algorithm converges, it results in a network in which none
of the devices can unilaterally improve its throughput. This
is referred to as a Nash network, which gives the stability
concept of the final network structure G⋆F . Specifically, the
Nash network is defined as follows.
Definition 5. A network graph G(N , E) with N denoting the
set of all notes, i.e. devices, and E denoting the set of all edges,
i.e, links between pairs of devices, is the Nash network in its
strategy space Si, ∀i ∈ N , if no device i ∈ N can improve
its payoff by a unilateral change in its strategy si ∈ Si.
In the Nash network, all the links are chosen based on the
best responses of devices and are thus in the Nash equilibrium.
In a network with finite number of devices, the final network
structure G⋆F resulting from the proposed CGG is a Nash
network.
Algorithm 2 Distributed Multi-path Routing
Initial State
In the starting network, each source device transmits directly
to its destination device.
Network Structure Formation Process
repeat
Phase 1 Dynamic Virtual Link Replacement
The devices play their strategies sequentially in a random
order.
repeat
1) During each iteration y, every device on transmis-
sion performs pairwise negotiation with other idle
devices from cooperative operators and calculates its
potential payoff improvement under cooperation.
2) After negotiation, each device i plays its best
response s⋆i , based on its flow rate demand.
until none of the devices can further improve its
payoff by a unilateral change in its strategy.
Phase 2 Feedback
Each device i sends the information about the link
(i, j) ∈ G⋆F back to its operator for a coalition
formation decision.
until Acceptance of the convergent network structure by all
the operators which perform Algorithm 1, i.e., Algorithm 1
converges.
Phase 3 Multi-hop Routing
All the source and relay devices perform multi-path
routing according to the final network structure G⋆F .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulation Setting
For simulation, we consider an LTE-A network with a TDD-
OFDMA scheme, locating within a 1000m×1000m area. The
bandwidth available in this network is 2MB. The maximum
transmit power of each device is 20mW . We calculate the
capacity of each link according to Shannon capacity. The noise
level is −90dBm. For the wireless propagation, as in [13], we
set the path loss exponent n = 4 and antenna related constant
β = 62.5. Four operators are considered in this LTE-A
networks. For each operator, there is one internal flow session.
For each flow session, the source device and destination device
are randomly selected. The number of devices from each
operator is varied from 3 to 8. The results presented in this
section are averaged over 1000 times of run with random
location of devices.
B. Convergence Behavior of the Coalitional Graphical Game
We first examine the convergence speed of the CGG at
the device layer. To this end, we set the coalition cost to be
C = 0. In this case, the grand coalition is always one of
the stable coalitional structures. Hence, the simulation with
this setting is equivalent to performing the CGG given the
coalitional structure of grand coalition at the operator layer.
Each flow is assigned with a random rate requirement within
[10, 20]kb/s. In Fig. 2, we show the average and the maximum
number of iterations required till convergence of the algorithm
from the initial network structure (i.e., direct transmission), as
a function of the number of devices. As expected, with the
increase of the number of devices, more interactions among
devices is required for the CGG to converge. Observing from
Fig. 2, we find that when the total number of devices varies
from 12 to 32, the average and maximum numbers of iterations
15 20 25 30
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Total number of devices
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f i
te
ra
tio
ns
Number of iterations versus number of devices
 
 
Average number of iterations
Maximum number of iterations
Fig. 2. Number of iterations versus total number of devices.
12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Total number of devices
Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 u
tili
ty
Aggragrated utility versus number of devices
 
 
LGC
LCG−variant
Non−cooperative
Fig. 3. Aggregated utility versus total number of devices.
vary from 2.35 and 5 to 5.86 and 14, respectively. Thus, on
average, the convergence speed of the algorithm is satisfactory.
C. Case Study of Four-operator Coalition with Uniformly
Distributed Devices
We then examine the proposed LCG in a LTE-A network
with uniform distribution of devices. The revenue obtained
in a time unit for successfully transmitting a unit throughput
(i.e., 1Kbps) is 120. The operation cost PCi is considered to
be the power consumption cost. For each device to transmit
or forward flow in a time unit, the cost is 500 per Watt.
We assume that when the operators make cooperation with
another, a fixed cost C is incurred to both of them. Thus, the
total coalition cost afforded by operator h for being in coalition
S is ξSh = C(|S| − 1). The total coalition cost for operator h
can be calculated by ξh =
∑
S∈Γh
ξSh . We set C = 5.
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed LCG
by presenting the average aggregated utility of all operators
achieved as a function of the number of total devices. For
comparison, we also study an LCG variant (labeled as “LCG-
variant”) which substitutes the proposed CFG at the operator
layer with a coalition formation game only enabling non-
overlapping coalitions. We use the recursive core as the
stability concept for the partition of operators and adopt a
solution similar to the merge-only algorithm proposed in [12]
to find a stable partition. Moreover, we use the result of non-
cooperative case (labeled as “Non-cooperative”), in which the
operators work independently with each individual performing
CGG among its own devices, as the lower bound perfor-
mance. We can observe from the figure that cooperation brings
significant performance gains over non-cooperative case. The
proposed LCG employing overlapping CFG outperforms the
LCG variant with non-overlapping CFG. This is because the
overlapping CFG allows more freedom in coalitional structure
formation for potential utility improvement. In addition, we
can observe that the performance gap between LCG and the
LCG variant increases with the number of devices in the
network.
V. CONCLUSION
The hierarchical cooperation in LTE-A networks is a
promising solution for high speed data transmission and wide-
area coverage. In this paper, we have presented a game-
theoretic framework to model the hierarchical cooperation
problem. Specifically, we have proposed a layered coalitional
game (LCG) to model the cooperation behavior among the op-
erators and devices in the different layers of LTE-A networks.
The concept of extended recursive core has been advocated as
the solution of stable coalitional structures. We proposed an
overlapping coalition formation game for operators to find a
stable coalitional structure lies in the extended recursive core
that benefits all the cooperative operators. While, a coalitional
graphical game has been introduced for devices to form the
stable network structures for multi-path routing. Numerical
results have shown that the proposed LCG yields notable
gains relative to both the non-cooperative case and a LCG
variant. The future work will characterize the performance gap
between the proposed LCG and the optimal solutions obtained
by centralized approaches.
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